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Abstract: Empirical studies on military expenditure-growth nexus in individual countries and cross-
national countries abound, however, to the best knowledge of the authors; there are no studies on the 
impact of military expenditure and Institutional quality on Inclusive growth. The objective of this paper 
is to fill the gap by investigate the impact of military expenditure and institutional quality on BRICS 
inclusive growth from 1984 to 2017. This paper adopted BRICS countries because they account for 
about 26.11 % of total world military expenditure. Due to the heterogeneous nature of BRICS countries, 
the countries were grouped into Upper Middle-Income countries and Lower Middle-Income countries 
using the World Bank Income Classification. In addition, corruption was adopted as the reliable proxy 
for institutional quality, since corruption is often a symptom of bad institution. The result of the impact 
of military expenditure and corruption on inclusive growth in the lower middle-income group indicates 
that military expenditure and corruption have positive and statistically significant effects on inclusive 
growth while the interactive term has negative and statistically significant effect on inclusive growth. 
This implies military expenditure reduces inclusive growth in the face of corruption. However, for the 
upper middle income, military expenditure is negative and significant as against that of lower middle 
income. Corruption and interactive term have negative effects on inclusive growth but both are 
statistically insignificant.  
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1.1. Introduction 
The effect of military expenditure on growth is a longstanding debate in defense 
economics and peace literatures, dating back to empirical studies by (Benoit, 1973; 
Benoit, 1978) which argued that military expenditure has a positive impact on 
economic growth via the provision of the enabling environment (Security) for local 
and international investment. Furthermore, it contributes to growth via utilization of 
resources, particularly in employment generation, Research and Development, 
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provision of vocational training (Menla Ali & Dimitraki, 2014; Meng et al., 2015; 
Zhao et al., 2015). 
However, recent studies have identified an adverse link between military expenditure 
and economic growth this happens as it crowd-outs public investment, from 
productive activities to unproductive ones (Ward & Davis, 1992; Mintz & 
Stevenson, 1995; Klein, 2004; Kentor & Kick, 2008; Shahbaz & Shabbir, 2012). 
Therefore, impact of military expenditure on growth is mixed and inconclusive with 
results depending on the country or sample of countries, the time period or 
methodology used (Smith, 2000; Dunne et al., 2005; d’Agostino et al., 2017) has 
presented in Table 1. This subject matter has secured a growing attention adopting a 
wide–range empirical studies which made use of various methodologies and 
theoretical frameworks, a consensus has not been reached (Dunne et al., 2005, 
Alexander, 2015). 
Table 1. Different views on Military expenditure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A potential link for this mixture of conclusion is the environment that military 
expenditure is taking place. For instance, (Aizenman & Glick, 2006, Compton & 
Paterson, 2016) affirms that high military expenditure in the presence of high threat 
environment leads to economic growth via the provision of security while high 
military expenditure in the presence of low threats will retard economic growth via 
wide spread corruption and rent seeking. (d’Agostino et al., 2012) further examined 
military expenditure-growth in the presence of corruption using African sample from 
2003 to 2007.They found that corruption does influence the impact of military 
expenditure on growth. In related paper, (d’Agostino et al., 2017) re-examined the 
MILITARY EXPENDITURE 
Negative effect (Public waste)
Crowding out of other more productive 
forms of public spending as well as 
investment (Dash et al., 2016; Künü et al., 
2016; Malizard, 2016).
Positive effect (Public-Investment)
Increased employment, positive 
externalities such as technological 
advances, infrastructure creation, human 
formation and employment opportunities 
(Zhang et al., 2016; Yildirim & Öcal, 
2016; Bellos, 2017).
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military expenditure –growth using 1996-2007 period by employing a System GMM 
estimation confirms that military expenditure and corruption does retard economic 
growth. 
Recently (Compton & Paterson, 2016) consider how institutions can impact military 
expenditure-growth nexus. Based on 100 countries of annual data from 1988 to 2010 
by employing Panel Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and system-generalized methods 
of moments (GMM).The authors find that military expenditure on growth is negative 
or zero at best and this impact is lessened in the presence of good economic and 
political institutions. 
This paper builds on this area of work, by adapting corruption as a reliable proxy for 
institutional quality, since corruption is a symptom of bad/weak institution. For 
instance, weak institution stimulate wasteful military expenditure via lack of checks 
and balances leads to an irrational expenditure decision, which might retard inclusive 
growth.  
Furthermore, the author contribute to this area of research by incorporating a newly-
developed BRICS inclusive growth index1 as proxy for growth while examining the 
military expenditure–growth nexus under World Bank Income classification. The 
empirical analysis is based on (Aizenman & Glick, 2006; Compton & Paterson, 
2016) works. 
The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries are referred to 
as next World economic powerhouse characterized with high-income growth and 
active military industries. The rationale for investigating the BRICS countries for 
this study are as follows. One, BRICS countries account for about 26.11% of total 
world’s military expenditure and devotes a huge percentage of their total government 
expenditure to military expenditure. According to SIPRI (Institute) affirm that 
average military expenditure share of government expenditure was 4.1% for Brazil, 
10.8% for Russia, 10.1% for India, 9.7% for China and 4.7% for South Africa for 
the period 2000-2014. 
Two, the intra-conflict rivalry among BRICS countries also makes this empirical 
investigation an interesting one to explore. For example, the India conflicts with 
China has been affirmed; and as two of the world’s fast growing powerhouse 
countries, their relationship synergy plays a significant influence in the political 
domain. Finally, on a general note, World’s military expenditure has declined due to 
peace dividend however; BRICS countries still assign a high percentage of their 
Central government budgetary allocation to military sector and industries despite 
witnessing harsh socio-economic inclusive growth challenges. For instance, BRICS 
countries are experiencing a downturned GDP growth rates coupled with high 
unemployment rates, crime rates, high poverty rates, high-income disparity, climate 
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change and a host of others. In Conclusion, military policy can be said to be of great 
important for the BRICS countries. 
1.2. Institutional Failure in BRICS Countries 
“If we do not kill corruption, corruption will kill us” 
(Anonymously, 2018) 
“You thief cent you are in prison; 
You thief 10 million this patriotism. 
You are given chieftaincy and national honour 
You steal even bigger, this is refer to as rumour 
(Wole Soyinka, 1985 literature Nobel Prize winner, Unlimited Liability Company, 
1983) 
Over the past 40 years corruption has become the prism through which BRICS 
countries is seen the world over. The most recent report (2018) on the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) published by Transparency International (TI) ranks BRICS 
countries has presented below. The ranking score criteria is as follows 100-50 are 
referred to less corrupt countries while 49 - 0 are referred to as more corrupt 
countries. 
Table 2. CPI 2018 Ranking score and World Bank Income Classification 
S/N Countries CPI 2018 Ranking score 2018 World Bank income Classification 
1 Brazil 40 Upper Middle income 
2 Russia 29 Upper Middle income 
3 India 40 Lower Middle income 
4 China 40 Upper Middle income 
5 South Africa 45 Upper Middle income 
Source: Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranking 2018, World Bank 2018 
Therefore, based on the above CPI 2018 rankings score, all BRICS countries are 
regarded as corrupt countries. However, four out of BRICS club countries are ranked 
Upper Middle income countries except India according World Bank countries 
classification has presented above. 
1.3. Types of Corruption in BRICS Countries 
In the development literature, corruption is typically defined roughly as the abuse of 
public office or entrusted power for private gain (Bank, 1997; International, 2009). 
Public office is abused for private gain when an official accepts, solicits, or extorts 
a bribe, or when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies 
and process for competitive advantage and profit. Public office can be abused for 
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personal benefit, even if no bribery occurs, through patronage and nepotism, the theft 
of state assets, or the diversion of state revenues(Bank, 1997).Corruption include 
bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, the use of “speed money” 
and embezzlement. 
It should be noted that corruption is not limited to the official domain and there is no 
suggestion in this paper that official corruption is the only important aspect. The 
private sector is a prone as the public sector to abuse of power of position for private 
gain. It is also almost implicated in government corruption as a motivator of corrupt 
behaviour and a repository for its proceeds. The focus of this paper on official 
corruption is due merely to the need to keep the scope discussion manageable. 
Several approaches to classifying corruption have been proposed (Kpundeh & Hors, 
1998; Karklins, 2016; Vargas-Hernández, 2013). The easiest approach analytically 
may be to distinguish between petty, grand and political corruption, depending on 
the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs. 
Petty corruption consists of small-scale embezzlement and misappropriation; bribery 
demand by or offered to low-level official in order to bend rules; use of licensing 
and inspection powers for extortion, and perpetrating minor acts of favoritisms. The 
typical incident of petty corruption involves a private citizen dealing with a low-
level government bureaucrat in a straightforward transaction such as goods clearance 
or issuance of driver’s license or passport. These acts of corruption can be subtle- a 
mere gesture or hint that a small consideration is expected. It can also be more direct, 
an explicit demand or a threat that the file could stop “moving” if a gift is not offered. 
Grand corruption is misuse of public office at higher levels within the state (Rose-
Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). It includes large scale embezzlement and 
misappropriation via public procurement; payment for non-existent goods or 
services; contrived losses in public procurement; large kickbacks in government 
payroll and extending economic privileges to special interests. The extreme example 
of grand corruption is “state capture”, which is when top politicians and bureaucrats 
collude with private actors to turn the state into a private moneymaking machine.  
Political corruption includes gross abuse of the country’s mechanism of restraint: 
legislative and judicial processes, as well as auditing, investigatory, and oversight 
powers; subversion of electoral processes through vote-buying and bribery of 
accountable official; large-scale assignment of public property to privileged 
interests; politically motivated loans by banks and financial institutions; large 
contribution from public coffers to private causes and large political donations and 
bribes to parties and party official.  
Without aiming to be comprehensive, some major expression of these types of 
corruption in BRICS are highlighted  
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Table 3. Types of corruption in BRICS 
Type  Main Actors Mode 
Petty Corruption Low and mid-level public official Small scale embezzlement  and 
misappropriation; bribes to bend rules or 
ignore misdemeanors; using licensing and 
inspection powers for extortion; minor 
favoritisms 
Grand corruption High level public officials; political; 
representatives of donor and recipient 
countries; bureaucratic elites; 
businessmen and middlemen 
Large-scale embezzlement and 
misappropriation via public procurement; 
payment for non-existent goods or 
services; kickbacks; ”ghost workers” on 
government payroll; economic privileges 
given to special interest; 
Political corruption Top-level executive; legislative and 
judicial officials; bureaucratic elites; 
politicians; big business 
Abuse of legislative powers; corruption of 
the judicial process; abuse of auditing, 
investigatory, and oversight powers; 
Undermining electoral processes through 
vote-buying  and bribery of accountable 
officials, large-scale assignment of public 
property to privileged interests; large 
contributions from public coffers to 
private cause; large political donations 
and bribes 
Another survey by TI shows a perception of widespread corruption among the 
country’s major institutions of policy ,restraint and service delivery(International, 
2009).Respondent were asked questions: “Percentage of respondent who felt the 
following institutions in BRICS countries were corrupt or extremely corrupt” . 
Table 4. Percentage of respondent who felt the following institutions in BRICS 
countries were corrupt or extremely corrupt 
Institutions Brazil % Russia % India % China % South Africa% 
Political parties 84 77 86 N/A 77 
Police 70 89 75 N/A 83 
Legislature 72 83 65 N/A 70 
Public officials & civil 
servants 
46 92 65 N/A 74 
Judiciary 50 84 45 N/A 50 
Education systems 33 72 61 N/A 32 
Military 30 70 20 N/A 11 
Medical and health 
service 
55 75 56 N/A 55 
Business 35 57 50 N/A 54 
Media 30 59 41 N/A 40 
NGOs 35 45 30 N/A 43 
Religious Organization 31 40 44 N/A 24 
Source: Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2013 
https://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country?country=south_africa 
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1.4. Theoretical Framework on Military Expenditure and Growth  
(Aizenman & Glick, 2006) developed a theoretical framework to analyze military 
expenditure-growth nexus based on (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1992) work. They 
opined that military expenditure assert negative or insignificant effect on growth in 
the presence of corruption because of its non-linearity and omitted variable biases. 
(Aizenman & Glick, 2006) postulated that threat is a key factor to determine if 
military expenditure will assert positive impact on growth or not. 
↑ 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 + ↑ 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝. = ↑
𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ (𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟 𝑣𝑖𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦)                
↓  𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 + ↑ 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝. = 
↓  𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ (𝑣𝑖𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔) 
This can be written mathematically as follows 
𝜕 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ
𝜕 𝑚
= ∝1+ 𝑎1𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠 ; 𝑎1  < 0, 𝑎2  > 0  
 
𝜕 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ
𝜕 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡
=  𝑏1 +  𝑏2𝑚 ; 𝑏1  < 0, 𝑏2  > 0 
G= growth rate of real GDP per capita; m= military expenditure; threat- level of 
country’s effective military threat. 
The basic growth equation for this research adopt (Aizenman & Glick, 2006) and 
(Compton & Paterson, 2016) empirical approaches written as  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑖𝑡+𝛽2𝐼𝑖𝑡+𝛽3 𝑀 . 𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where Y- is the inclusive growth index, 𝑀 .  (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡- is the interaction of 
military expenditure with institution, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 – is the set of control variables – education, 
population and Investment variables. 𝜖𝑖𝑡  is the error term. 
(Aizenman & Glick, 2006) postulate that the direct impact of military expenditure 
and external threats on growth are assumed to inverse relationship while 
collaborative impact is positive. The Barro style model of military expenditure-
growth relationship indicate that military expenditure influenced by external threat 
stimulate output by increasing security whereas, military expenditure influenced by 
rent seeking and corruption will retard growth, by disrupting productive economic 
activities. 
Recently (Compton & Paterson, 2016) consider how institutions can impact military 
expenditure-growth nexus. Based on 100 countries of annual data from 1988 to 2010 
by employing Panel OLS and generalized methods of moments (GMM), the authors 
find that military expenditure on growth is negative or zero at best and this impact is 
lessened in the presence of good economic and political institutions. 
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Theoretical Literature on Institution 
Generally, there are three dominant schools on institutional thoughts (Thoenig, 
2003) namely, incentive institutionalism, cultural institutionalism and historical 
institutional. (Thoenig, 2003) provided four separate streams of the institutional 
theory, viz historical institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, new 
institutionalism and local order or actor institutionalism. It is along these threads that 
this chapter relates the theoretical propositions on institutions. Basically, the social 
institution is enshrined in the seminal study of (Selznick, 1949), which presents 
public agencies as institutional actors who create a level playing ground , and 
produce participatory leadership and involvement. 
Public management is not limited to the art of designing formalized structures but 
also considers the way participants are influenced, transformed and completed by 
informal structures. In this setting, the populace, the have-nots as well as the poor, 
are considered as more important than those as the highest hierarchy of the ladder. 
As such, public bureaucracy must cope with the constraints and pressures applied by 
the populace is cultivated and the stringencies and intricacies accorded the corridors 
of power are often relaxed to build confidence and ensure general acceptance from 
the people. With this, public institutions develop in a gradual process through the 
support, understanding and cooperation of the people. 
In social institutions, even though the need for change is often illusory, as it tends to 
sap ideas and delimit innovations, pressures for change could occur in two ways. It 
could be internal and endogenously engineered or external and exogenously 
influenced which sometimes, could collapse the existing fabric of the institution 
(Oliver, 1992). The change operates through three identified mechanism: coercive 
isomorphism –change results from pressures exerted by political influence or by 
outside organizations considered legitimate; mimet isomorphism-uncertainty and 
ambiguity about goals or technology increase the adoption of imitation conducts; 
and normative isomorphism-the influence of individuals belonging to the same 
profession or having followed the same educational processes. 
Historical institutionalism was initiated in the eighties and it suggests that public 
administration remains a sub set of political life such that the state machinery cannot 
exist in isolation por afford to be neutral (Hall et al., 2010). Public policies are seen 
as an inter-governmental instrument, which influences the choices made today based 
on the steps taken in the past. 
Empirical Studies  
Military expenditure and Growth 
(Stroup & Heckelman, 2001) investigated the military expenditure–growth nexus 
using the augmented version of Barro styled model by incorporating military labour 
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for the period of 1975-1989 by utilizing fixed panel estimation technique. Their 
result show that military expenditure, military labour and growth relationship are 
non-linear. Thus, low levels of military expenditure and military labour stimulate 
growth and vice versa. 
(Aizenman & Glick, 2006) use Barro style growth model to explore the impact of 
military expenditure on economic growth taking cognizance of threat of 90 countries 
spanning 1989-1999. The empirical result revealed that military expenditure and 
antagonistic threat have negative effect on growth, whereas, military expenditure in 
the midst of threats stimulate growth. This innovative specification indicates that 
output is influenced by security or military expenditure depending on the presence 
of hostile threat. 
(Yakovlev, 2007) use the Barro growth model for 28 countries over the period of 
1965-2000 to examine the impact of military expenditure, arm trade on economic 
growth. Employing random and fixed effects and GMM techniques. The cross 
sectional results revealed that high military expenditure coupled with net arms 
exports separately retards growth whereas, net arms exporting countries coupled 
with high military expenditure does not retards economic growth. 
In summary, Barro styled model postulates that military expenditure influence by 
external threats stimulate output via provision of security for lives and properties 
whereas military expenditure gear-up via corruption and rent seeking will retard 
growth, thus disrupting productive economic activities. 
Institution and Economic growth 
The question on the actual role of institutions in growth process is not yet entirely 
clear beyond the belief that good development and good institution go together. 
However, (Acemoglu et al., 2005) clearly affirm that good institution is a key 
determinant of growth in any economy. Government with good institution promotes 
favorable business environment, which recognize and rewards creativity. 
Countries with good institutions often channel their public expenditure decision in 
stimulating and promoting growth inclusive. Process. This latter connection between 
institution and inclusive growth forms the crux of the investigation in this chapter 
using BRICS countries as a case study. 
Institution, as defined by (North, 2006), is a set of formal and informal rules that 
govern the behaviour of individuals and organizations. Formal rules include 
constitutions, laws, regulations, and political system, while informal rules refer to 
social norms, values and beliefs. In this context, institutions structure the incentives 
that affect behaviors and provide a framework for economics exchanges .Good 
institutions and sound policies create an environment that fosters economic 
development through accumulation of factors of production and efficient use of 
resources. More often, the conceptualization of institutions allows the view that 
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institutions are all rules or forms of conduct, which are intentionally devised to 
reduce uncertainty that result from imperfect information, control the environment 
and social interaction, as well as lower transaction cost (Ménard & Shirley, 2005).  
(Ostrom, 2015) defined institutions as the sets of working rules that are used to 
determine who is eligible to make decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed 
or constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what procedures must be 
followed, what information must or must not be provided and what pay-offs will be 
assigned to individuals dependent on their actions. 
A considerable amount of country and cross-country studies has been done on the 
relationship between economic growth and institution. Among the prominent ones 
is that of (Acemoglu et al., 2005) which emphasized the fundamental importance of 
institutions in causing growth and differences in the levels of development across 
countries. Also, while examining discussions on institutions and economic 
development, (Chang, 2011) suggested that more attentive institutional economists 
were needed to focus on the real world institutional research, rather than retelling 
fairy-tales. According to the author, it is on the basis of reality and not fictions, that 
policy-relevant theories of institutions could be developed. 
In a panel study, (Valeriani & Peluso, 2011) explore the effect of institutional quality 
on economic growth over sixty years among countries at different stages of 
development, using pooled regression fixed effects model to test three institutional 
indicators which included civil liberties, number of veto players and quality of 
government. The result revealed that institutional quality impacted positively on 
economic growth. However, further finding from the study showed that the size of 
the institutional impact on growth varies between developed and developing 
countries considered. Thus, in conclusion, the study claimed that institution mattered 
for growth. 
Also, (Berggren et al., 2013) investigated the impact of institutions on economic 
growth in the EU-27, seven other similar European countries and Israel over the 
period from 1984 to 2009.The result of the panel data analysis submitted that then 
quality of policy which included stability of government, favourable socio economic 
condition, strong investment environment and democratic accountability, was 
growth-enhancing.  
According to (Bhupatiraju & Verspagen, 2013) explained differences in the levels 
of development across countries using a multi-faceted database to measure 
institutions. Findings showed that institutions ranked above other factor when GDP 
per capita was the regressand. However, when factors such as investment and growth 
were included as independent variable, institutional factors was negatively 
associated with development variables.  
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In summary, the results presented above depicts mixed relations between institution 
and economic growth. As institution impact varies as it effect is positive on growth 
in a period, it affect negatively on economic performance in another period. 
Military Expenditure, Institution and Growth 
(Aizenman &Glick, 2006; Compton & Paterson, 2016) affirms that high military 
expenditure in the presence of high threat environment leads to economic growth via 
the provision of security while high military expenditure in the presence of low 
threats will retard economic growth via wide spread corruption and rent seeking.  
(d’Agostino et al., 2012) further examined military expenditure-growth in the 
presence of corruption using African sample from 2003 to 2007.They found that 
corruption does influence the impact of military expenditure on growth. In related 
paper, (d’Agostino et al., 2017) re-examined the military expenditure –growth using 
1996-2007 period by employing a System GMM estimation confirms that military 
expenditure and corruption does retard economic growth. 
Recently (Compton & Paterson, 2016) consider how institutions can impact military 
expenditure-growth nexus. Based on 100 countries of annual data from 1988 to 2010 
by employing Panel Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and system-generalized methods 
of moments (GMM).The authors find that military expenditure on growth is negative 
or zero at best and this impact is lessened in the presence of good economic and 
political institutions. 
Data and Empirical Approach  
Data  
Considering the connection between military expenditure and institutions on 
inclusive growth in BRICS countries, (1984-2017). Inclusive growth index data that 
covers from 1984 to 2017 were presented in the appendix. Military expenditure data 
were obtained from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute extended 
database 1948 to 2017, which is relatively the standard in the literature.  
Another variable of concern is institutional quality variables. Here, the proxy for 
institutional quality is corruption. The institutional quality proxy variable is source 
from IRIS/International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database. Each of the ICRG 
measures range of 0 to 6, with higher values representing less corruption. In other 
words, higher scores indicate better institutions. 
Other variables were obtained from World Bank Development Indicators (WDI). 
Study period  
The study period is 1984 to 2017. Due to the heterogeneous nature of BRICS 
countries, the countries were grouped according to World Bank income classification 
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of Upper Middle Income countries (UMIC) and Lower Middle Income countries 
(LMIC).Data source for military expenditure at share of GDP were obtained from 
SIPRI database because it has more complete data series.  
Description of Variables and data source 
Variables  Definition Sources 
Key variables 
I.G Inclusive growth Index  Author computation1  
ME Military expenditure 
(Share of GDP) 
World Bank and Stockholm 
International Peace 
Research Institute new 
extended database 1984-
2017 
External Threat External threats are classified 
as wars involving two 
independent countries  
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) database 
1984 -2017 
 
 
Internal threat Internal threats includes Civil 
war, insurgency crisis and 
communal clashes 
Institutional quality Corruption as proxy for 
institutional quality 
POP BRICS Population growth rate  
 
World Bank Development 
Database 2018 (WDI) 
 
Security Web BRICS Security Web 
measured by averaging of the 
ratio of military expenditure to 
GDP of BRICS neighboring 
countries 
INV. Investment 
EDU BRICS Education 
 
  
                                                             
1 The authors employed Z-sum score technique in this study. In this approach, equation for the 
normalized value according to KotharI, C.R. 2004. Research methodology: Methods and techniques, 
New Age International, Ullah, S. & KianI, A.K. 2017. Maqasid-al-Shariah-based socio-economic 
development index (SCECDI): The case of some selected Islamic economies. Journal of Emerging 
Economies & Islamic Research, 5..After finding the Z-sum score, the authors evaluate the average of 
the area under the curves already normalized. These values are considered as inclusive growth index 
by the following: Inclusive Growth Index (I.G.I.) = Average of Z score is divided by number of 
observation that is I.G.I.= 50% of Social Growth indicators + 50% of Economic Growth Indicators 
(IGI=
∑ 𝑥
𝑛
 ) 0<IGI<1. 
The values of the IGI index vary between 0 and 1; if values close to 0 indicates that BRICS countries 
has very low level of inclusive Economic growth. On the other hand, values close to 1 indicates that 
the BRICS countries has a very high level of inclusive Economic growth.  
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Empirical Approach   
For the empirical analysis, times series panel approach was adopted. The panel 
growth equation for this research adopt (Aizenman & Glick, 2006) and (Compton & 
Paterson, 2016) empirical approaches written as  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑖𝑡+𝛽2𝐼𝑖𝑡+𝛽3 𝑀 . 𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where Y- is the inclusive growth index, 𝑀 .  (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖𝑡- is the interaction of 
military expenditure with institution, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 – is the set of control variables – education, 
population and Investment variables. 𝜖𝑖𝑡  is the error term. The panel model is 
estimated using panel OLS rather than other estimation technique because their no 
presence of endogeneity while possibility of heterogeneity is taking care by using 
the World Bank Income classification. 
Data Estimation and Interpretation  
The study begins the analysis of the impact of military expenditure and institutional 
quality on inclusive growth in BRICS countries with descriptive analysis. Results of 
the descriptive statistics are reported in Table 5. Summary of the descriptive results 
shows that all the series show a high level of consistency as their means and medians 
fall within the maximum and minimum values of these series. Results of standard 
deviation, which measures the level of variation or degree of dispersion of the 
variables from their means, reveal that the actual deviation of the data from their 
means are very small as all the standard deviations are very low. Also, the most 
volatile is the variable of interaction between military expenditure and corruption 
(4.15%) while the least volatile is the GDP (0.18%) follow by population growth 
(0.41%). 
Table 5. Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
 Growth Military Corrupt. Mil*Cor
r 
Educatio
n 
Pop. Invest. 
Mean  0.560548  1.675531  1.888973  3.961608  1.997633  8.234231  1.350123 
Median  0.530000  1.512503  2.000000  3.344052  1.627790  8.160083  0.777008 
Maximum 
 0.920000  5.503756  5.330000  20.78054  6.371640  9.097859  6.186882 
Minimum 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  7.546916 
-
0.178437 
Std. Dev.  0.182348  1.390113  1.618897  4.151119  2.268775  0.412856  1.581964 
Observatio
n 
146 146 146 146 146 146 146 
Table 6 presents the correlation matrix of the exogenous variables used to achieve 
the second objectives. Correlation matrix shows the degree of association and 
direction of relationship among the variables. Results in Table 7 show that the degree 
of association that exists among the independent variables. It can be deduced that 
that all independent variables can be included in the same model without the fear of 
multicollinearity. Furthermore, result shows that while all other independent 
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variables and the interactive variable have negative relationship with inclusive 
growth, population growth is the only variable that has positive relationship with 
inclusive growth. 
Table 6. Correlation Matrix 
 
Corruption 
Educatio
n Growth 
Investme
nt Military Mil*Cor. Pop 
Corruption  1.000000 
      
Education  0.442204  1.000000 
     
Growth -0.409220 -0.389133  1.000000 
    
Investment  0.310443  0.311967 -0.186814  1.000000 
   
Military  0.356456  0.006495 -0.539541  0.237188  1.000000 
  
Mil*cor  0.774648  0.203598 -0.497215  0.166961  0.700897  1.000000 
 
POP -0.194754 -0.279060  0.283095  0.132430 -0.260201 -0.243763 
1.000000 
The next step is to examine whether long-run relationship exists among the variables. 
To achieve this, Pedroni Panel cointegration test was carried out. The major 
condition for using Pedroni approach to panel cointegration is that the number of 
variables must not be more than seven. The test conducted shows within group and 
between group coefficients. After satisfying this condition, cointegration test was 
carried out and result is presented in table 7. Results show that out of the four statistic 
in the within group section, two are significant while the other two are not 
significant. In addition, one out of the three statistic in the between group section is 
significant. This implies the null hypothesis of cointegration is rejected. Therefore, 
the study concludes that long run relationship exists among the variables. 
Table 7. Pedroni Panel Cointegration Test Results 
 t- Statistic        Prob. 
Within Group 
Panel v-Statistic -1.317433  0.9062 
Panel rho-Statistic  2.330635  0.9901 
Panel PP-Statistic  2.392952    0.0016** 
Panel ADF-Statistic  0.090380    0.0060** 
Between Group 
Group rho-Statistic 2.049197  0.9798 
Group PP-Statistic 0.565818  0.7142 
Group ADF-Statistic -1.693105 0.0452** 
Finally, theory suggests that corruption plays an important role in the military 
expenditure-growth nexus. The line of argument in the literature is that corruption 
raises the desired level of military spending and that military expenditure, in the 
presence of corruption, reduces growth. In order to confirm the validity or otherwise 
of this hypotheses, this study presents empirical evidence concerning the relationship 
among military spending, institutional quality, and growth in BRICS countries.  
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Table 8. Impact of Military Expenditure and Corruption on Inclusive Growth in the 
Lower Middle Income and Upper Middle Income Countries 
Dependent Variable: Inclusive Growth 
Variable LMI UMI 
Military Exp 0.412 
(0.01)* 
-0.067 
(0.00)* 
Corruption 0.380 
(0.03)* 
-0.007 
(0.58) 
Mil*Cor -0.129 
(0.02)* 
-0.0007 
(0.91) 
Ledu -0.013 
(0.34) 
-0.029 
(0.00) 
Gpop 0.325 
(0.57) 
0.008 
(0.78) 
Inv/gdp -0.009 
(0.79) 
0.008 
(0.35) 
Constant -3.77 
(0.48) 
0.666 
(0.01) 
R2 0.37 0.44 
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.42 
F-statistic 3.63(0.00) 18.86 (0.00) 
Breusch-Pagan LM Test 3.42(0.00) 14.31(0.02) 
Results of the impact of military expenditure and corruption on inclusive growth in 
the lower middle income and upper middle income are presented in table 8. For the 
lower middle income, military expenditure and corruption have positive and 
statistically significant effects on inclusive growth while the interactive term has 
negative and statistically significant effect on inclusive growth. This implies military 
expenditure reduces inclusive growth in the face of corruption. Investment in the 
lower middle income during the period under study is negative and not significant. 
For the upper middle income, military expenditure is negative and significant as 
against that of lower middle income. Corruption and interactive term have negative 
effects on inclusive growth but both are statistically insignificant. Investment in the 
upper middle income has positive effect but insignificant. 
Dependent Variable Inclusive Growth 
Variable Coefficient  Prob. 
Military Exp -0.012 0.8201 
Constant 0.529 0.0000 
R2 0.000218  
Adjusted R2 -0.003983  
F-statistic     0.05(0.82)  
Breusch-Pagan LM Test   79.08(0.00)  
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Conclusion 
Corruption during this period has negative impact on inclusive growth and the result 
is statistically significant. Investment during this period has positive effect on 
inclusive growth and is statistically significant. This follows economic theory, as 
government will invest more in order to mitigate the negative effect of war on the 
economy. This implies military expenditure reduces inclusive growth in the face of 
corruption. Investment in the lower middle income during the period under study is 
negative and not significant.  
In conclusion, for the upper middle income, military expenditure is negative and 
significant as against that of lower middle income.  
 
Recommendation  
This section also highlight some recommendations for BRICS countries on how to 
achieve optimum inclusive growth: 
I. To achieve a positive optimum budgetary allocation to defence there is need for 
a more transparent and accountability processes in all military contracts and 
related agencies; 
II. Military manufacturing industries must be established with the mandated to 
produce all their nation hardware needs and thereafter export to other members 
of the BRICS club; 
III. There is need for the government to strengthen constitutional anticorruption 
institutions and civil societies to ensure that corrupt tendencies within military 
sector are reduced to the barest minimum. 
IV. Aggressive public education to change the mind set of BRICS citizens to make 
them see corruption as evil and a common enemy. 
V. Establishment of special courts to deal with corruption cases separately and 
strengthen the weak legal system  
VI. The punishment meted out to corruption convicts, so far, is not enough to deter 
anyone from indulging in the evil practice. Therefore, it is recommended that 
death penalty for convicts. Such stringent punishment can root out corruption in 
the BRICS countries. 
VII. Anti-graft bodies agencies should ignore primordial sentiment and go ahead to 
jail whosoever is involved in corruption. 
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Appendix 
BRICS inclusive growth index from 1970 to 2017 
Year Brazil 
IGI 
Russia 
IGI 
India 
IGI 
China 
IGI 
South Africa 
IGI 
1970 0 0.92 0.98 0.75 0.58 
1971 0.58 0.91 0.43 0.72 0.46 
1972 0.62 0.91 0.44 0.45 0.52 
1973 0.63 0.9 0.4 0.48 0.51 
1974 0.58 0.9 0.37 0.49 0.52 
1975 0.65 0.88 0.37 0.48 0.53 
1976 0.52 0.89 0.27 0.5 0.45 
1977 0.59 0.86 0.31 0.51 0.43 
1978 0.65 0.86 0.4 0.56 0.38 
1979 0.56 0.79 0.37 0.55 0.38 
1980 0.38 0.83 0.46 0.72 0.43 
1981 0.55 0.83 0.56 0.82 0.39 
1982 0.43 0.84 0.57 0.85 0.43 
1983 0.38 0.82 0.66 0.65 0.32 
1984 0.52 0.8 0.65 0.88 0.26 
1985 0.53 0.83 0.32 0.87 0.23 
1986 0.36 0.85 0.37 0.87 0.24 
1987 0.47 0.84 0.35 0.51 0.28 
1988 0.58 0.84 0.3 0.27 0.36 
1989 0.61 0.78 0.25 0.75 0.19 
1990 0.38 0.7 0.36 0.68 0.35 
1991 0.5 0.71 0.38 0.75 0.27 
1992 0.61 0.41 0.33 0.74 0.24 
1993 0.68 0.48 0.34 0.61 0.39 
1994 0.7 0.5 0.36 0.4 0.33 
1995 0.61 0.48 0.38 0.56 0.41 
1996 0.65 0.4 0.32 0.49 0.45 
1997 0.67 0.4 0.33 0.49 0.35 
1998 0.64 0.4 0.31 0.4 0.32 
1999 0.61 0.4 0.24 0.52 0.4 
2000 0.57 0.41 0.37 0.45 0.53 
2001 0.61 0.43 0.36 0.37 0.39 
2002 0.59 0.41 0.36 0.52 0.37 
2003 0.55 0.42 0.37 0.39 0.3 
2004 0.58 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.43 
2005 0.51 0.47 0.35 0.44 0.38 
2006 0.53 0.47 0.35 0.41 0.52 
2007 0.53 0.43 0.37 0.4 0.39 
2008 0.53 0.46 0.35 0.47 0.53 
2009 0.59 0.51 0.3 0.4 0.38 
2010 0.54 0.51 0.21 0.52 0.38 
2011 0.56 0.44 0.32 0.42 0.52 
2012 0.56 0.47 0.23 0.47 0.4 
2013 0.56 0.47 0.25 0.42 0.39 
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2014 0.61 0.44 0.23 0.46 0.41 
2015 0.6 0.57 0.25 0.54 0.26 
2016 0.66 0.72 0.35 0.87 0.24 
2017 0.91 0 0.2 0.87 0.09 
Source: Author Computation 
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